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to membership upon presentation of a traveling card, nor 
have they shown that they changed their position or relied 
upon plaintiff's conduct to their injury. Plaintiff's statement 
on being admitted that he was satisfied with the way his 
traveling card had been handled and his subsequent accept-
ance of the benefits of membership did not operate to estop 
him from asserting any rights which may have accrued be-
fore his admission. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, .J., S~hauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 18194. In Bank. May 26, 1953.] 
Estate of CHARLES J. ARBULICH, Deceased. JOHN 
ARBULICH, JR., Appellant, v. THOMAS S. ARBU-
LICH, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Inferences Indulged.-
On appeal from a judgment, every reasonable inference from 
the evidence must be drawn in favor of respondent. 
[2] Alienage-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by 
resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit 
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 
1947, treaties, statutes and other evidence of foreign domestic 
law may be considered in determining whether on that date 
United States citizens had a reciprocal right to take property 
in Yugoslavia by succession or testamentary disposition, as 
required by Prob. Code, § 259. 
[3] Statutes- Construction: Treaties- Construction.- Where 
treaties or statute law alone are before court their construc-
tion is a matter of law, but question of how foreign country 
has construed and applied such treaties or statutes is one of 
fact. 
[4] Alienage-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-A finding by trial 
court on issue of reciprocity with respect to right of United 
States citizens to take property by succession or testamentary 
[2] State statute making right of alien to succeed to property 
dependent on reciprocal right in United States citizens, note, 170 
A.L.R. 966. See, also, Cal.Jur.2d, Alienage and Citizenship, § 14; 
Am.Jur., Aliens, § 40 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1244; [2, 4-9] 
Alienage, § 28; [3] Statutes, § 111; Treaties, § 3. 
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r!isposition in a foreign country will not bP disturbed on appeal 
if there is sufficiPnt evirlence tn sust.>tin Rneh finding. 
[5a-5c] !d.-Inheritance- Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by 
resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit 
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 1947, 
a finding that United States citizens on that date did not have 
a reciprocal right to take property in Yugoslavia by suc-
eession or testamentary disposition is sustained by evidence of 
Constitution of Yugoslavia, effective January 31, 1946, de-
claring that "right of inheritance is regulated by law"; by a 
Yugoslav decree dated July 16, 1946, declaring that foreign 
citizens may acquire real property "by legacy ... only by 
previous approval of the competent government agency," and 
that such limitations shall not refer to acquisitions by "legal 
inheritance"; by a Yugoslav decree dated March 20, 1948, 
which tends to confirm the differentiation established by the 
prior decree; and by the Yugoslav foreign exchange law which 
makes the right of an American citizen to receive Yugoslav 
property by testament dependent on uncontrolled discretion 
of Minister of Finance. 
[6] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resi-
dent and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit 
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 1947, 
provisions of treaty entered into in 1881 between United States 
and Serbia which treat only of "citizens of the United States 
in Serbia [Yugoslavia] and Serbian [Yugoslav] subjects in 
the United States," rather than of a United States citizen who 
dies in the United States and leaves property to a Yugloslav 
subject who is in Yugoslavia, are inapplicable on the issue of 
reciprocal right of United States citizens to take property by 
succession or testamentary disposition in Yugoslavia. 
(7] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resi-
dent and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit 
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 
1947, testimony by Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the United 
States that "Yugoslavia accords to citizens and residents of 
the United States their full and equitable rights of inherit-
ance under ... the Convention [treaty] of 1881" and that 
"whether the Convention itself is applicable or not ... 
Americans do have their full, complete and unabridged rights 
of inheritance to inherit from their relatives or from their 
estate in Yugoslavia," serves at most to create a conflict in 
evidence as to the ultimate fact and is not controlling on the 
issue of reciprocity. 
[8] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resi-
dent and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit 
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 
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1947, any error in admission of opinion evidence as to whether 
reciprocity existed with respect to personal property is not 
prejudicial where, in the light of other evidence on the sub-
ject, it is not likely that a different result would have been 
reached in the trial court if the disputed opinion evidence had 
not been received. ( Const., art. VI, § 4Yz.) 
[9] Id.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Right.s.-The right to take prop-
erty by inheritance and right to receive that inheritance by 
payment in money are part of substantive incidents of normal 
legal order of society, and are inseparable from each other . 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco determining heirship. 
'1'. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge . .Affirmed. 
Haas & Schwabe, Hubbard & Hubbard, Peter .A. Schwabe 
and Emmet B. Hayes for .Appellant. 
:B~rank J. 0 'Brien for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Following hearings on petitions to de-
termine heirship in this estate the probate court found that 
on March 21, 1947, the date of death of the decedent (see 
Estate of Giordano (1948), 85 Cal..App.2d 588, 594 [193 P.2d 
771]), the reciprocal inheritance rights prescribed by section 
259 of the Probate Code did not exist between residents and 
citizens of this nation and those of Yugoslavia as to either 
real or personal property. Judgment was thereupon entered 
to the effect that decedent's surviving brother Thomas (re-
spondent herein), residing in and a citizen of the United 
States, is entitled to distribution of decedent's entire estate, 
to the exclusion of a surviving brother, John, who resides in 
and is a national of Yugoslavia. The two brothers are de-
cedent's sole heirs at law. John appeals, contending that the 
evidence is not sufficient to support the finding of nonreci-
procity. The question before us is not whether we, if we were 
viewing the evidence initially, should find that the greater 
weight seemed to favor appellant or the respondent but is, 
rather, whether we can hold that as a matter of law the finding 
of the probate court is without substantial evidentiary sup-
port. [1] Every reasonable inference must be drawn in 
favor of the respondent. (Holmberg v. Marsden (1952), 
39 Cal.2d 592, 596 [248 P.2d 417] .) So viewing the evidence 
we have concluded that appellant's contention cannot be sus-
tained and that the judgment should be affirmed. 
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Charles J . .Arbulich, the decedent, was a naturalized citizen 
of the United States who died in San Francisco. By his 
will he left his entire estate, consisting of both real and 
personal property, to his father if the father survived the 
testator, otherwise to the testator's brother, appellant John 
Arbulich, Jr., of Yugoslavia. The father predeceased Charles. 
Both respondent Thomas and appellant John (by the Consul 
General of Yugoslavia, who purports to be John's attorney-
in-fact) filed petitions to determine heirship, and this pro-
ceeding followed. 
The question on the merits, as already indicated, is whether 
the evidence supports the court's finding that the reciprocal 
rights required by the provisions of section 259 of the Probate 
Code did not exist on March 21, 194 7. 1 [2] Treaties, 
statutes, and other evidence of the foreign domestic law may 
be considered. (Estate of Knutzen (1948), 31 Cal.2d 573, 579 
[191 P.2d 747]; Estate of Bevilacqua (1948), 31 Cal.2d 580, 
582 [191 P.2d 752] .) [3] Where treaties or statute law 
alone are before the court the construction thereof is a matter 
'Section 259 read as follows on that date: ''The right of aliens not 
residing within the United States or its territories to take real property 
in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same 
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is 
dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the 
part of citizens of the United States to take real property upon the same 
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries 
of which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not residing 
in the United States or its territories to take personal property in this 
State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms 
and conditions as residents and citizens of tbe United States is dependent 
in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of 
citizens of the United States to take personal property upon the same 
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries 
of which such aliens are residents. It shall be presumed that such 
reciprocal rights exist and this presumption shall be conclusive unless 
prior to the hearing on any petition for distribution of all or a portion 
of such property to an alien heir, devisee or legatee not residing within 
the United States or its territories a petition is filed by any person in· 
terested in the estate requesting the court to find that either one or both 
of such reciprocal rights does not or do not exist as to the country of 
which such alien heir, devisee or legatee is resident. Upon the hearing 
of such petition the burden of establishing the nonexistence of such 
reciprocal right or rights shall be upon the petitioner. Notice of such 
hearing shall be given in the manner provided by Section 1200 of this 
code.'' 
Effective in September, 1947, section 259 was amended by striking 
therefrom the last three sentences as quoted hereinabove. At the same 
time section 259.1 (added to the Probate Code in 1941 and repealed in 
1945) was added, as follows: "The burden shall be upon such nonresident 
aliens to establish the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth 
in Section 259.'' 
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of law, but the question of how the foreign country has 
construed and applied such treaties or statutes is a question 
of fact. [ 4] A finding by the trial court on the issue of 
reciprocity is to be treated like a finding on any other issue 
of fact and if there is evidence to support it such finding will 
not be disturbed on appeal. (See Estate of Schluttig (1950), 
36 Cal.2d 416, 423-424 [224 P.2d 695] ; Estate of Reihs (1951), 
102 Cal.App.2d 260, 268 [227 P.2d 564] ; Estate of Miller 
(1951), 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [230 P.2d 667].) 
The following documentary evidence was included in that 
before the court in this proceeding: 
1. A copy of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, which ap-
parently became effective on January 31, 1946. It is declared 
therein, among other things, that (Article 18), "Private prop-
erty and private initiative in economy are guaranteed. The 
inheritance of private property is guaranteed. The right of 
inheritance is regulated by law. No person is permitted to 
use the right of private property to the detriment of the 
people's community ... Private property may he limited 
or expropriated if the common interest requires it, but only 
in accordance with the law. It will be determined by law in 
which cases and to what extent the owner shall be com-
pensated. Under the same conditions individual branches of 
national economy or single enterprises may be nationalized 
by law if the common interest requires it. [Article 19.] The 
land belongs to those who cultivate it. The law determines 
whether and how much land may be owned by an institution 
or a person who is not a cultivator. There can be no large 
land-holdings in private hands on any basis whatsoever. The 
maximum size of private land-holdings will be determined by 
law." 
2. A Yugoslav decree dated July 16, 1946, pertaining to 
the acquisition of real property by foreigners. It provides, 
in part, that "Foreign citizens may acquire rights to owner-
ship of real estate in ... Yugoslavia either by legal busi-
ness among the living or by legacy (in case of death) only by 
previous approval of the competent government agency .... 
[Such] limitations ... shall not refer to acquisitions of real 
estate by legal inheritance ... Permits ... shall be issued 
by the Chairman of the Economic Council of [Yugoslavia] 
. . . '' with an appeal ''to the Government'' allowed if a 
permit is refused. The Chairman of the Economic Council 
is ''authorized to issue instructions and explanations in con-
nection with the application of this decree.'' The decree 
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provides no guide or standard to control the chairman or 
"the Government" iu determining when and whether permits 
shall issue. 
3. A Yugoslav decree dated March 20, 1948, entitled "Con-
trol of Real Estate Transactions,'' which provides in article 
5 thereof that ''Foreign citizens may not acquire right of 
property on real estate [in] ... Yugoslavia, except on the 
basis of legal inheritance,'' and in article 8 that ''The pro-
visions hereof are not valid for acquiring real estate by 
Yugoslav citizens on the basis of legal inheritance or on the 
basis of inheritance through testaments.'' Article 10 in-
validated the decree of ,July 16, 1946 (item No. 2, herein-
above). 
4. A copy of a letter2 dated January 19, 1949, from A. G. 
Heltberg, American Consul in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, ad-
dressed to the Controller of the State of California, in which 
it is stated, among other things, that the provision of the 
Yugoslav decree of March 20, 1948, that "Foreign citizens 
may not acquire right of property or real estate [in] ... 
Yugoslavia except on the basis of legal inheritance," has 
been ''informally interpreted'' by the claims office of the 
Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs "to mean that foreign 
citizens may inherit property if they, under Yugoslav law, are 
considered to be the natural heirs of the deceased. If property 
is willed to some other person than the natural heir that 
person may not succeed to the property in question.'' 
[5a] It is apparent that the evidence summarized herein-
above is sufficient to support a finding that on the date of 
decedent's death in 1947 reciprocal rights did not exist with 
respect to real property. In the decree of July 16, 1946 
(which remained in effect until invalidated by the decree of 
March 20, 1948), it is declared that foreign citizens may ac-
quire real property "by legacy (in case of death) only by 
previous approval of the competent government agency," and 
that such limitations shall not refer to acquisitions by "legal 
inheritance.'' As already noted herein, no standards are pro-
vided to guide either the government agency or a testator in 
determining in what situations, if any, such acquisition by 
legacy would be approved, and it is inferable that the grant-
ing, the withholding, or the conditions of granting, approval 
may vary from case to case according to the discretion of 
the governmental agency as exercised in an unbounded field 
2 .Admitted into evidence without objection from appellant. 
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and unguided by standards of equality of application. The 
situation thus appears to be comparable to that before the 
court in Estate of 8chlnttig ( 1950), sttpra, 36 Cal.2d 416, 
425, in which it was held that when "the taking of estates by 
testamentary disposition or succession is a matter of suf-
ferance determinable in accordance with directions of the 
Nazi officials and their concepts of national sentiment, there 
is no 'reciprocal right' as that term is used in the Probate 
Code.'' 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that section 259 of the 
Probate Code, which is here involved, limits the right of the 
nonresident alien "to take real property in this State by suc-
cession or testamentary disposition,'' to those instances where 
there is "a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the 
United States to take real property upon the same terms and 
conditions as residents and citizens" (italics added) of the 
country of the alien's residence. That the terms and condi-
tions on which foreigners may acquire real property in Yugo-
slavia by testament differ from those on which it may be so 
acquired by Yugoslav citizens is a reasonable inference to 
be drawn from the decree of July 16, 1946. Although the 
provisions of the decree of March 20, 1948, and of the inter-
pretation thereof by Yugoslav authorities which is set forth 
in the consular letter of Jan nary 19, 1949, do not directly 
establish Yug·oslav law as of the date of the testator's death 
herein (March, 1947), they do tend to confirm that under the 
decree of July 16, 1946, a differentiation was established be-
tween the right of foreigners who are natural heirs of the de-
ceased to succeed to real estate "by legal inheritance" and 
any rights claimed by other foreigners to take real estate 
"by legacy (in case of death) . " 
[6] Appellant contends, nevertheless, that the provisions 
of article IP of a treaty entered into in 1881 between the 
United States and the Kingdom of Serbia (of which the present 
Republic of Yugoslavia is the successor government) and cer-
tified by the Secretary of State of the United States as re-
3 Article II of the treaty reads as follows: "In all that concerns the 
right of acquiring, possessing, or disposing of every kind of property, 
real or personal, citizens of the United States in Serbia and Serbian 
subjects in the United States, shall enjoy the rights which the respective 
laws grant or shall grant in each of these states to the subjects of the 
most favoured nation. 
"Within these limits, and under the same conditions as the subjects 
of the most favoured nation, they shall be at liberty to acquire and dis· 
pose of such property, whether by purchase, sale, donation, exchange, 
May 1953] EsTATE OF ARBULICH 
[41 C.2d 86; 257 P.2d 433] 
93 
maining m full force and effect between this country and 
Yugoslavia, are applicable and controlling in appellant's 
favor on the issue of reciprocity. It may be noted that the 
:first paragraph of article II seemingly treats only of "citizens 
of the United States in Serbia [Yugoslavia] and Serbian 
[Yugoslav] subjects in the United States," rather than, as is 
the situation in the present case, of a United States citizen 
who dies in the United States and leaves property to a Yugo-
slav subject who is in Yugoslavia, and therefore is not here 
applicable. Even if we assume its applicability in that respect, 
however, the rights gTanted are only those given by each of 
the contracting nations ''to the subjects of the most favoured 
nation,' 'and do not purport to equal the rights given or guar-
anteed by each of the contracting nations to its own citizens. 
Consequently the treaty provisions do not establish the recipro-
cal rights required by the Probate Code. 
[7] Testimony by the Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the 
United States that "Yugoslavia accords to citizens and resi-
dents of the United States their full and equitable rights of 
inheritance under . . . the Convention [treaty] of 1881, . . . 
[and that] whether the Convention itself is applicable or not 
. . . Americanll do have their full, complete and unabridged 
rights of inheritance to inherit from their relatives or from 
their estate in Yugoslavia," serves at most to create a conflict 
in evidence as to the ultimate fact and is not controlling on 
the issue of reciprocity. Upon the record we are bound to 
hold that the evidence is not as a matter of law insufficient 
to support the finding of the trial court that at the time of 
decedent's death reciprocal rights within the meaning of the 
applicable statute did not exist as to real property. 
[8] As to whether reciprocity existed with respect to per-
sonal property, there is a substantial conflict of opinion evi-
dence and both appellant and respondent urge that evidence 
of that nature, offered by the other, was improperly received. 
\Ve need not pass upon such contentions, however, because it 
does not appear that the errors, if any, in regard to the ad-
mission of opinion evidence were prejudicial. In the light 
marriage contract, testament, inheritance, or in any other manner what-
ever, without being subject to any taxes, imposts, or charges whatever 
other or higher than those which are or shall be levied on natives or on 
the subjects of the most favoured state. 
''They shall likewise be at liberty to export freely the proceeds of 
the sale of their property, and their goods in general, without being sub-
jected to pay any other or higher duties than those payable under similar 
circumstances by natives, or by the subjects of the most favoured state.'' 
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of the other evidence upon the subject, hereinafter mentioned, 
we do not think it likely that a different result would have 
been reached in the trial court if the disputed opinion evidence 
had not been received. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2.) 
[5b] Aside from the expressions of opinion, a copy of the 
Yugoslav Constitution, as hereinabove mentioned, and copies 
of Yugoslav decrees governing transactions with foreign 
countries and their nationals were received in evidence with-
out objection, and such Constitution and decrees in themselves 
support the finding of the trial court that reciprocity did not 
exist with respect to personal property. Provisions of the 
Constitution have already been mentioned. The first of the 
decrees, which became effective September 7, 1945, provides: 
"630. By virtue of Article 2 of the Resolution of November 
30, 1943 on the Supreme Legislative and Executive People's 
Representative Body of Yugoslavia as a provisional organ of 
the supreme people's authority in Yugoslavia and in con-
nection with the Resolution of August 10, 1945 covering the 
change of name of the Antifascist Council of National Libera-
tion of Yugoslavia into Provisional People's Assembly of the 
Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, and at the suggestion of 
the Minister of Finance, the Presidium of the Provisional 
People's Assembly of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia 
decree. 
''THE LAW 
''REGULATING PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
"(FoREIGN ExcHANGE LAw) 
''BAsiC RuLES 
''Article 1 
''All financial transactions with foreign countries, as well 
as all transactions within the country in relation to foreign 
countries that may affect the development of the credit bal-
ance of our country and the international value of our 
domestic currency (foreign exchange transactions) are sub-
ject to the control of the Federal Minister of Finance (foreign 
exchange control). 
''Article 2 
"Primarily the following transactions are subject to con-
trol. 
"(a) All transactions within the country and with foreign 
countries: in foreign exchange, claims and debts in foreign 
currency and other values in foreign currency; 
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''(b) All transaf;tions with foreign countries: in domestic 
emrency, credits and debits in domestic currency and other 
values in domestic currency; 
'' (c) .All transactions with foreigners within the country, 
causing changes in property relations between our country 
and foreign countries ; and . . . 
''Article 3 
''The term transaction from .Articles 1 and 2 as used in 
this law means the transfer of values and metals and pay-
ments, it also means the establishment, cancellation and change 
of obligations and actual rights to values and metals, as well 
as changes of holders of rights and obligations. 
''Article 4 
''Permission must be had for transactions described in 
Articles 1 and 2 of this Law according to foreign exchange 
regulations. 
''Article 5 
"It is forbidden to conclude business in the country the 
amount of which in domestic currency is tied to gold or some 
foreign currency .... 
''Article 6 
" ( 1) The Federal Minister of Finance as the supreme 
foreign exchange authority, exercises his control over foreign 
exchange through : [various agencies] . . . 
"(2) The Federal Minister of Finance regulates the limits 
of jurisdiction as between the foreign exchange authorities 
in regard to the exercising of foreign exchange control, be it 
by Regulations from .Article 25 of this Law, or by separate 
decisions. 
''Article 7 
"(1) Transactions, subject to foreign exchange control ac-
cording to this Law, may be conducted only by persons and 
establishments authorized to do so by the competent foreign 
exchange authorities, unless the conduct of such business IS 
permitted by the foreign exchange rules themselves. . . . 
''Article 8 
''The National Bank, whenever authorized by the Federal 
Minister of :B-,inance, may at any time request the holders in 
the country to offer for sale to the National Bank all their 
foreign exchange (regardless whether it be in the shape of 
claims in foreign currency, checks, drafts, etc.), foreign cur-
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rency, foreign values and precious metals. If the National 
Bank decides to buy, it shall fix the terms .... 
' 'Article 12 
'' ( 1) rrhe term 'devisa' as used in the foreign exchange 
regulations means a claim abroad on whatever basis, in what-
ever currency, regardless of the manner of disposal. ... 
''Article 13 
"(1) The term foreigner·s as used in this Law means all 
persons and corporations with permanent residence or seat 
abroad, regardless of citizenship of persons and ownership 
of enterprises. 
"(2) rrhe term domestic persons means all persons and cor-
porations with permanent residence or seat within the coun-
try, regardless of citizenship of persons and ownership of 
enterprises. . . . 
"Article 16 
'' ( 1) The penalties for foreign exchange infractions are: ... 
'' 2. Confiscation of objects or values constituting the 
foreign exchange infraction, in full or in part. . . . 
"(2) The Federal Minister of Finance shall pronounce 
penalties .... 
' 'Article 25 
''The Federal Minister of Finance shall issue more detailed 
rules, regulations and decisions for the execution of this Law, 
upon consulting the National Bank .... " 
The second decree, effective October 25, 1946, confirms 
the decree of September 7, 1945, and amends it in various 
respects which appear to be largely immaterial here. How-
ever, article 24 of the second decree provides that ''The Min-
ister of Finance of FPRY is herewith authorized to issue 
regulations, instructions, orders and decrees for the execu-
tion of this law,'' thus confirming the apparently unlimited 
power of the Minister of Finance over foreign exchange trans-
actions. 
Appellant urges that the "Foreign Exchange Law" 
has no materiality in relation to the question of reciprocity; 
that it is merely "regulatory of foreign exchange and has no 
reference whatever to rights of inheritance.'' But a reading 
of the entire substance of the documents mentioned makes it 
apparent that the trial court was justified in reaching the con-
clusion that under Yugoslav law a citizen of the United States, 
at the time of decedent's death, had no definitely ascertain-
able and enforceable right to receive Yugoslav property by 
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and that the receipt of any such property would 
in each ease upon the largely, if not entirely, uncon-
trolled discretion of the Minister of F'inance. 'I'his is far dif-
ferent from a standardized regulation which might merely 
delay the transmission of gold, money, or other stores of value 
from one nation to another. (See Estate of Schluttig (1950), 
supra, 36 Cal.2c1 416, 425; cf. Estate of .Miller (1951), supra, 
104 Cal.App.2d 1, 12, 13.) [9] Here it is pertinent to ob-
serve, as vvas declared in Estate of Blak (1944), 65 Cal.App. 
2c1 232, 288 [H50 P.2c1 567]: "'I'he 'right' to take property by 
inheritance and the 'right to receive' that inheritance by pay-
ment in money, have long been recognized as part of the sub-
stantive, legal and sanctioned incidents of the normal legal 
order of society .... The 'right' to receive the benefits of 
the inheritance is a necessary and inherent corollary to the 
'right' to take by inheritance. One is not separable from the 
other. 'L'he one includes the other. If the right to take exists 
... the right to receive exists ... '' 
[5c] Upon the record before us, which includes the Con-
stitution and the Resolutions and Decrees of Yugoslavia as 
above mentioned, we cannot hold that as a matter of law the 
trial court was not justified in concluding that whether a citi-
zen of the United States, as of the date of decedent's death, 
might in any particular case actually receive possession and 
marketable title to real estate in Yugoslavia devised to him or 
personal property, or its value, bequeathed to him, was a 
matter of grace or individual indulgence rather than of right 
based on uniform law. 
By reason of our conclusion that no prejudicial error is 
shown and that the evidence supports the finding of the trial 
eourt that on the date of decedent's death reciprocity as con-
templated and deiined by our law did not exist in Yugo-
slavia with respect to either real or personal property, it be-
eomes unnecessary to consider or decide respondent's further 
contentions. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion is out of harmony with my concept 
of the principles of .law applicable to this case and I am in 
full accord with the views expressed in the able and learned 
41 C.2d-4 
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opinion prepared by Mr. ,Justice Peters when this case was be-
fore the District Court of Appeal and adopt said opinion 
as my dissent: 
''Charles J. Arbulich, the decedent, was born in the country 
now known as Yugoslavia, came to the United States, became 
an American citizen, died in San Francisco on March 21, 
1947, and left an estate consisting of real and personal prop-
erty. By his will he disinherited his American citizen brother, 
the respondent Thomas S. Arbulich, and left his entire estate 
to his father, if he should survive the testator, and if not 
then to his brother, the appellant, John Arbulich, Jr., a Yugo-
slav citizen and resident. The father predeceased Charles. 
Both Thomas and John (John through the Consul General 
of Yugoslavia) filed petitions to determine heirship, it being 
contended by Thomas that John was ineligible to take under 
the will for the reason that Yugoslavia, so it is claimed, does 
not grant reciprocal rights of inheritance to American citi-
zens inheriting from citizens of Yugoslavia within the meaning 
of section 259 of the Probate Code. John claimed such 
reciprocal rights existed. A petition by one claiming to be 
the widow of Charles was also filed, but the issues presented 
by that proceeding have been settled and are not here involved. 
''After a trial which spread over many months because 
of numerous continuances granted to permit the parties to 
secure and to present evidence on the basic issue of reciprocity, 
the trial court determined that reciprocity did not exist, that 
John was therefore ineligible to take under the will, and 
that the entire estate should be distributed to Thomas as the 
sole remaining heir at law. John, through the consul general, 
appeals. 
''Before discussing the evidence which, except for the testi-
mony of the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, is 
almost entirely documentary in character, some reference 
should be made to the general law governing such proceedings. 
It should be pointed out that section 259 of the Probate Code 
is not merely a procedural statute, but is part of the sub-
stantive law of succession. That being so, the statute as it 
read at the time of the death of the testator desiring to leave 
property to an alien governs. (Estate of Giordano, 85 Cal. 
App.2d 588 [193 P.2d 771] .) Charles died March 21, 1947. 
Section 259 as it read in March of 1947 (Stats. 1945, p. 
2208, chap.l160) and until its amendment in September of that 
year, then provided: 'The right of aliens not residing within 
the United States or its territories to take real property in 
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this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the 
same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the 
United States is dependent in each case upon the existence of 
a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United 
States to take real property upon the same terms and condi-
tions as residents and citizens of the respective countries of 
which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not 
residing in the United States or its territories to take personal 
property in this State by succession or testamentary disposi-
tion, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citi-
zens of the United States is dependent in each case upon the 
existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the 
United States to take personal property upon the same terms 
and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective 
countries of which such aliens are residents. It shall be pre-
sumed that such reciprocal rights exist and this presumption 
shall be conclusive unless prior to the hearing on any petition 
for distribution of all or a portion of such property to an 
alien heir, devisee or legatee not residing within the United 
States or its territories a petition is :filed by any person in-
terested in the estate requesting the court to find that either 
one or both of such· reciprocal rights does not or do not exist 
as to the country of which such alien heir, devisee or legatee is 
resident. Upon the hearing of such petition the burden of 
establishing the nonexistence of such reciprocal right or rights 
shall be upon the petitioner. Notice of such hearing shall 
be given in the manner provided by Section 1200 of this code.' 
''Thus, as the section then read, there was a statutory re-
buttable presumption that reciprocity existed, and the one 
contending there was a lack of reciprocity had the burden of 
proving that fact. 
''The cases have also established the law to be that while 
the interpretation of foreign statutes and of treaties, when 
they alone are before the court, is a question of law, the ques-
tion of how such statutes and treaties have been interpreted 
and applied by a foreign country is a question of fact. The 
appellate courts will not disturb a finding of reciprocity or 
of nonreciprocity that is supported by a presumption or is 
based on conflicting evidence. (Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 
2d 416 [224 P.2d 695]-:finding of nonreciprocity with Ger-
many on April 3, 1945, affirmed; Estate of Miller, 104 Cal. 
App.2d 1 [230 P.2d 667], finding of reciprocity with Ger-
many as of April 22, 1942, affirmed; Estate of Blak, 65 Cal. 
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App.2d 232 [150 P.2d 567], a finding of reciprocity with the 
Nether lands (date of death not disclosed, but prior to 1942 
and during German occupation of Holland) affirmed; Estate 
of Giordano, 85 Cal.App.2d 588 [193 P.2d 771], a finding of 
nonreciprocity with Italy as of January 17, 1945, affirmed; 
Estate of Rm:hs, 102 Cal.App.2d. 260 [227 P.2d 564], a finding 
of reciprocity with Germany as of November 24, 1946, af-
firmed; Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal.App.2d 621 [235 P.2d 
837], a finding of reciprocity with Romania as of March 15, 
1949, affirmed.) In all of these cases it was held that where 
the finding of reciprocity or nonreciprocity was based on con-
flicting evidence or supported ·by a rebuttable presumption it 
would not be disturbed by an appellate court, even where, 
as. to the same country, one trial court had found reciprocity 
to exist and another that it did not. (Compare the Schluttig, 
Miller and Reihs cases, cited supra.) 
"The case of Estate of Il.ennecly, 106 Cal.App.2d 621 [235 
P.2d 837], sets forth several other rules that are here appli-
cable. It held that the facts that a limited nationalization or 
socialization of property and industry had taken place in 
Romania, or that that country was communistic in nature 
and dominated by Russia, did not compel a finding of non-
reciprocity. It also held that once a statute enacted prior to 
the death of the testator involved is proved to exist, a pre-
sumption that such statute continued to exist arises under 
the provisions of section 1963, subdivision 32, of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, and that once such a statute is proved to 
exist, it will be presumed that the terms of such statute 
have been carried out under the provisions of section 1963, 
subdivisions 15 and 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
"The cases of Estate of JJiiller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1 [230 P.2d 
667], and Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232 [150 P.2d 567], 
held that the fact that the property inherited in a foreign 
country could not be immediately transferred to the United 
States, dnc to the war or to foreign exchange regulations, 
\Yas not relevant on the issue of reciprocity. 
'' 'l'hus, in the instant case, appellant was entitled, in the 
trial court, to the rebuttable presumption that reciprocity 
existed. If he could prove the existence of a treaty or statute 
of Yugoslavia enacted prior to March 21, 1947, granting 
reciprocity, he was then entitled to the rebuttable presump-
tions that that law continued to exist, and that such law was 
and would be enforced according· to its terms. Since the trial 
court has fonnd against these presumptions and against 
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reciprocity, the question is whether, keeping in mind the 
burden of proof and these presumptions, there is any sub-
stantial evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom to sup-
port the finding. 
''Although the burden was on respondent to prove non-
reciprocity, the appellant agreed to present his evidence that 
reciprocity existed before respondent offered his evidence. 
"'!.'he appellant first introduced a treaty of 1881 between 
Serbia and the United States, and the certificate of then Secre-
tary of State George C. Marshall dated May 21, 1948, duly 
authenticated, certifying that such treaty is still in force and 
effect between Yugoslavia and the United States. That cer-
tificate traces the history of the Kingdom of Serbia into the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, into the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, and finally, in November of 1945, into the 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and certifies that 
by agreement between the two countries the Serbian treaty 
of 1881 was still in full force and effect. The final clause of 
the certificate states 'that the said treaty remains in full force 
and effect between the United States of America and Yugo-
slavia.' 
''Article II of that treaty reads as follows: 
" 'In all that concerns the right of acquiring, posses;sing, 
or disposing of every kind of property, real or personal, 
citizens of the United States in Serbia and Serbian subjects in 
the United States, shall enjoy the rights which the respective 
laws grant or shall grant in each of these states to the sub-
jects of the most favoured nation. 
" ''Within these limits, and under the same conditions as 
the subjects of the most favoured nation, they shall be at 
liberty to acquire and dispose of such property, whether by 
purchase, sale, donation, exchange, marriage contract, testa-
ment, inheritance, or in any other manner whatever, without 
being subject to any taxes, imposts, or charges whatever other 
or higher than those which are or shall be levied on natives 
or on the subjects of the most favoured state. 
'' 'They shall likewise be at liberty to export freely the pro-
ceeds of the sale of their property, and their goods in general, 
without being subjected to pay any other or higher duties than 
those payable under similar circumstances by natives, or by 
the subjects of the most favoured state. • 
"There was next introduced the certificate of Sava N. Kosan-
ovic, Ambassador to the United States for Yugoslavia, duly 
authenticated by our State Department, and dated May 15, 
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1948, concerning the law of Yugoslavia with respect to the 
estates of decedents. The certificate contains the categorical 
assertion that reciprocity exists within the meaning of section 
259 of the Probate Code. The certificate states that the 
ambassador knows of his own knowledge that the Consti-
tution and laws of Yugoslavia' accord to citizens of the United 
States of America, including citizens of the State of California, 
though not residing in ... Yugoslavia, the reciprocal rights 
of inheritance prescribed and referred to in Sections 259 . . . 
of the Probate Code of the State of California. The Constitu-
tion and laws of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia 
permit and grant to citizens of the United States of America, 
including citizens of the State of California, though not resi-
dent in ... Yugoslavia rights equal to those accorded to 
Yugoslav citizens residing in ... Yugoslavia to take by will or 
succession any and all property located within ... Yugoslavia,' 
subject to the Nationalization Law of December 5, 1946, as 
amended April 28, 1948. The certificate then states that this 
Nationalization Law as amended provides for 'the national-
ization of real property owned by foreigners, except immov-
able property of farmers tilling their own land, buildings 
serving in the main as the homes of the owners thereof,' but, 
under the provisions of that act 'all the owners of nationalized 
property, are entitled to full compensation for such property.' 
''The certificate then goes on to state that by agreement with 
the United States 'all treaties previously concluded with the 
former Kingdom of Serbia ... are in full force and effect' 
between the United States and Yugoslavia. The certificate then 
quotes article II of the United States and Serbia treaty of 
1881, above quoted, and then certifies that the government of 
Yugoslavia 'has at all times construed and does now construe 
and respect said treaty as providing for and guaranteeing 
complete reciprocal rights of inheritance between the United 
States of America and ... Yugoslavia so that citizens of the 
United States of America, including citizens of the State of 
California, residing in the United States or wherever they may 
reside have the full and unabridged right to inherit and to 
receive and have paid to them all inheritances, by last will 
and testament or by succession, all money and property, real 
and personal, bequeathed, devised or due to them by the laws 
of the succession situated in the Federative Peoples Republic 
of Yugoslavia from the estates of deceased citizens' of Yugo-
slavia, subject only to the Nationalization Law as amended. 
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''A supplemental certificate of the ambassador, duly authen-
ticated and dated October 14, 1948, was also introduced. The 
ambassador there certifies that the rights of foreigners to 
inherit property in Yugoslavia as set forth in the original cer-
tificate has been the law since 1918 and up to the present time, 
and that there has been no change in such laws and none is 
contemplated. It is certified that 'it has always been the 
fixed policy of my Government and its predecessors to fully 
protect, preserve and assure the rights of all foreigners and 
residents outside of Yugoslavia to enjoy, take and receive 
full rights of inheritance of property, real, personal or mixed, 
without discrimination, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as residents and nationals of Yugoslavia' subject only 
to the Nationalization Laws. It is further certified, when 
moneys are due and payable to Yugoslav residents from United 
States decedents as a result of inheritance, that the recipients 
in Yugoslavia receive such moneys in Yugoslavia at the official 
rate of exchange free of any imposts, levies or taxes, 'and they 
have free and unabridged use and enjoyment thereof' subject 
only to such limitations as are imposed on Yugoslav nationals 
for the protection of the state. This supplemental certificate 
also notes that on July 19, 1948, the United States and Yugo-
slavia negotiated a claims agreement by the terms of which 
the Yugoslav government engages to authorize Yugoslav na-
tionals indebted to anyone in the United States 'to meet such 
indebtedness on maturity.' By the terms of that agreement 
Yugoslavia agreed to pay $17,000,000 to the United States for 
American property nationalized in Yugoslavia, to be distrib-
uted by the United States among the rightful claimants. 
''In addition to these two certificates, Ambassador Kosanovic 
was called as a witness by appellant. He testified that he was 
not only the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, but 
also a minister in the cabinet and a member of the Praesidium, 
the highest authority in his country. He presented a copy of 
the Constitution of Yugoslavia adopted in 1946 which, accord-
ing to his testimony and supported by an examination of the 
document, makes no discrimination, so far as the right to 
enjoy and inherit property is concerned, between Yugoslav 
citizens and foreigners. The Constitution provides that the 
'inheritance of private property is guaranteed. The right of 
inheritance is regulated by law.' In addition, the ambassador 
testified that there was no discrimination as against foreigners 
in connection with the right of inheritance, and that if inher-
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itance taxes are paid in the United States on a bequest to a 
Yugoslav citizen, that person will receive the inheritance with-
out further tax. He several times reiterated his statement that 
there were no laws or rules or regulations in any way 
restricting the right of an American to receive and to enjoy 
his inheritance in Yugoslavia. On cross-examination he testified 
that his country had exchange controls, and that under Yugo-
slav law anyone in the country receiving foreign exchange 
could be compelled to sell it to the state bank at regular ex-
change rates. He testified that there were no big estates in 
Yugoslavia, that the land formerly owned by big landowners 
had been nationalized, and that the maximum ownership of 
one individual is twenty-five hectares,* but that former owners 
including foreigners, were compensated. He also testified that 
money received by inheritance by Yugoslav citizens could be 
fully owned and enjoyed by such citizens. 
"Appellant then, over the objection that it was incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial, introduced as an official document 
an official communication between the Yugoslav Ministry of 
Justice and the Yugoslav Ministry of Labor dealing with the 
reciprocity question. This document states that under Yugo-
slav law 'the courts extend protection to all individuals in the 
exercise of their [inheritance] rights, regardless of whether 
they be Yugoslav nationals or foreign nationals.' It also 
states that under the 1881 treaty, which Yugoslavia recognizes, 
American citizens inheriting from Yugoslav nationals enjoy 
exactly the same rights and privileges over such property as 
do Yugoslav nationals. It is also asserted that the Ministry of 
Justice has always informed Yugoslav courts that reciprocity 
of inheritance exists between Yugoslavia and the United States. 
Attached is a copy of a decree of a Belgrade court distributing 
a portion of an estate in Yugoslavia to a United States citizen. 
"Another official communication between the Yugoslav Min-
istry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor, over objection, was 
introduced in which it is stated that the Ministry of Finance 
has never issued any regulation limiting the right of inher-
itance of estates of Yugoslav citizens by American citizens. 
The document states that, due to the shortage of foreign ex-
change, it has not always been possible to transfer .funds from 
Yugoslavia to the United States, but that it is the intention of 
the government to allow such transfers as soon as conditions 
permit. 
*A hectare is 2.4 71 acres. 
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'' 'l'his was appellant's case. It is obvious that such evidence, 
independent of the presumption of reciprocity, would fully 
support a finding of such reciprocity. But the trial court 
fo11nd that reciprocity did not exist. The question is whether 
thAre is any substantial evidence to support that finding. 
"Respondent first offered two letters, one from C. W. 
Cannon, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, elated 
August 14, 1947, and addressed to the then Attorney General 
of California, and the other from A. G. Heltberg, American 
consul at Belgrade, dated November 4, 1948, and addressed 
to Frank 0 'Brien, respondent's attorney. Neither of the 
letters to which these two letters were responses was offered. 
Both letters introduced purport to discuss certain laws and 
regulations of Yugoslavia and purport to give opinions as to 
how they are enforced. Appellant objected to the introduction 
of these letters on the grounds that they were incompetent, 
irrelevant, and immaterial, \Yere hearsay and that no proper 
foundation had been laid for their introduction. 'l'he objections 
were good. The letters should not have been admitted. There 
was no showing that Cannon or Heltberg were experts on 
Yugoslav law. In fact, the Heltberg letter states that 'this 
office can not assume responsibility for statements made in 
respect to the laws of Yugoslavia.' The letters were merely 
informal documents, and certainly were not official documents. 
The important question of whether a sovereign state abides by 
its laws and treaties should not be made to depend upon in-
formal offhand opinions of officials who may or may not be 
experts. Without a further showing, the letters should not 
have been admitted. 
"It must not be assumed that these two letters support 
the finding of nonreciprocity. They do not. Both relate 
primarily to the foreign exchange controls limiting the trans-
fer of funds from Yugoslavia to this country, a factor which, 
under the cases already cited, is not relevant on the issue of 
reciprocity. Cannon's letter was apparently in response to a 
letter from the attorney general telling Cannon that several 
Yugoslav residents and citizens had applied to recover funds 
on deposit in California banks, and inquiring if American 
citizens with money on deposit in Yugoslavia could withdraw 
such money, and requesting information about any currency 
regulations that might exist. Cannon replied that there were 
stringent regulations in force 'with regard to the export of 
foreign exchange and the transfer of property abroad.' Ref-
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erence is made to pertinent provisions of the Foreign Exchange 
Law putting all foreign exchange transactions under govern-
ment control, and requiring a permit for such transactions. 
The following paragraph of the letter is particularly relied 
upon by respondent: 
"'According to the Embassy's information, the Yugoslav 
authorities have, so far, not only granted no foreign exchange 
permits to American claimants to the proceeds of property in 
Yugoslavia, but have, with minor exceptions, made it impos-
sible for American citizens to establish their claims. In only 
one known instance has an American citizen actually been able 
to bring his claim to the point where his attorney could apply 
for a foreign exchange permit, and that application has been 
refused. This case involved a legacy.' 
''The letter then refers to the confiscation and nationaliza-
tion of many American properties. This letter was written 
before the claims settlement agreement, already referred to, 
was entered into between the two countries. 
''The letter of Heltberg to 0 'Brien also deals primarily 
with the foreign exchange law, a copy of which was enclosed. 
The letter states that the 'law provides for a tight control of 
all foreign currencies held by Yugoslavia, and it is the opinion 
of the Embassy that American heirs ordinarily would not be 
able to transfer their inherited monies [sic] into American 
currency.' Attention is then called to the fact that the embassy 
has records of but one case of such a transfer since the end of 
the war, and to a communication from the Yugoslav govern-
ment informing the embassy that 'it would grant transfers of 
funds derived from legally inherited properties within the 
limits of available foreign exchange stocks. However, because 
of lack of foreign exchange, the amounts for the time being 
would have to be deposited with the National Bank of the 
Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Yugoslav cur-
rency as property of foreign successors.' 
"The letter goes on to mention the fact that the Yugoslav 
decree . of March 20, 1948 'permits acquisition of real estate 
in Yugoslavia by foreigners but only on the basis of legal in-
heritance or for official use. All other real estate owned by 
foreigners would be nationalized. The American heir, how-
ever, would have little control over his inherited properties. He 
would have to have the approval and consent of the competent 
state authorities before he could sell, transfer or dispose of 
the property. He would not be able to sell, transfer or dispose 
of the property to a non-Yugoslav citizen. The amount of in-
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come derived from the property and the use of the property 
would be determined by local housing authorities. Further-
more, to complicate matters, the Yugoslav Government does 
not recognize the right of their citizens to be nationalized as 
American citizens. The Embassy believes it possible that a 
person possessing Yugoslav nationality under Yugoslav law 
and American citizenship under American law could inherit 
Yugoslav real estate in the same manner as other purely Yugo-
slav citizens. When such a dual national is subsequently 
divested of his Yugoslav nationality, his previously inherited 
properties in Yugoslavia would presumably be seized without 
right of indemnity.' 
''There was next introduced into evidence by respondent, 
without objection from appellant, a letter with six enclosures 
to Lawyer 0 'Brien dated December 24, 1948, from Francis E. 
Flaherty, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of Protective Serv-
ices, Department of State, Washington, D. C. The letter calls 
attention to the decree of March 20, 1948, passed a year after 
the death of the decedent here involved, which contains the 
following sentence: 'Foreign citizens may not acquire right 
of property on real estate on the territory of the Federative 
People's Republic of Yugoslavia, except on the basis of legal 
inheritance.' The letter then states that it had been thought 
that the Nationalization Law, which provides: 'On the day 
this law becomes effective, all real estate owned by foreigners 
. . . will be nationalized,' nullified the right of aliens to inherit 
at all, but by a decree of June 23, 1948, the right of foreigners 
to gain ownership of real property 'on the basis of legal inher-
itance' was reaffirmed. The letter then sets forth the same 
restrictions on such ownership as were set forth in Heltberg's 
letter above quoted, and then states that the Nationalization 
Law and the June decree 'are presently interpreted by Yugo-
slav officials so as to permit alien heirs to inherit or succeed to 
property only when, under Yugoslav law, they are also natural 
heirs of the deceased.' 
''The enclosures are translations of various laws and decrees 
and of a note from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to the United States dated October 9, 1948. Several of the 
enclosed laws and decrees relate to the foreign exchange con-
trols that have already been mentioned. One of the enclosures 
is a decree dated March 20, 1948, relating to the 'Control of 
Real Estate Transactions.' This decree was not in effect when 
decedent diea. It provides that all transfers of real property 
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are 'subject to prior approval by the competent state authori-
ties,' and provides that such authorities shall deny such 
approval when the transfer is made for speculative purposes, or 
when such transfer will produce a larger income than needed 
for livelihood, or would exceed the maximum area allowed for 
agricultural ownership. This decree also prohibits a foreign 
citizen from owning land 'except on the basis of legal inher-
itance.' .Attached to this decree is an 'Obligatory Interpreta-
tion' by the Praesidium, the highest authority in Yugoslavia, 
to the effect that a Yugoslav who acquires another citizenship 
forfeits his real estate to the state without compensation. 
''The official note above referred to from the Ministry of 
Foreign .Affairs of Yugoslavia to this country stated that the 
'Yugoslav Courts strictly apply all Yugoslav provisions, laws 
and international agreements clearly regulating the rights of 
foreign citizens to acquire or inherit to [sic] real or personal 
property situated in Yugoslavia, within the limits of the exist-
ing provisions and without any discrimination, i.e., under the 
same conditions as citizens of the most favoured nation.' Ref-
erence is then made to the decree of March 20, 1948, limiting 
foreign real estate holdings to those acquired as 'heirs at law,' 
and then it is argued that such provision is consistent with 
treaty obligations because all foreigners are treated alike. It 
is then stated that as to transfers abroad of legally inherited 
properties the Yugoslav government 'will grant such transfers 
within the limits of available foreign exchange stocks,' and 
when such stocks are not available the sum in question can be 
temporarily deposited in the national bank, in Yugoslav cur-
rency, as property of foreign successors. 
"Without objection, appellant next introduced a Yugoslav 
decree dated July 16, 1946, relating to the acquisition of real 
property by foreigners. It provides that foreigners may 
acquire real property in Yugoslavia 'either by legal business 
among the living or by legacy (in case of death) only by previ-
ous approval of the competent government agency.' .A lease 
to a foreigner for over five years likewise requires a permit, 
but neither of these limitations applies 'to acquisitions of real 
estate by legal inheritance.' .Agencies are designated with 
permit issuing powers and the right of appeal granted from 
their decisions. 
".Also without objection a copy of the Nationalization Law 
was introduced. In court counsel for respondent read into the 
record an amendment to that act adopted April 28, 1948, more 
than a year after the death of the decedent here involved. By 
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the amendment, most real estate, as of the effective date of the 
amendment, owned by foreigners, was nationalized, except real 
estate operated by peasant farmers or used by the owner as 
living quarters. The amendment also provided that Yugoslav 
citizens who became foreign citizens lose the right of ownership 
of real estate. 
''Also without objection there was introduced another letter 
from Heltberg, American Consul in Yugoslavia, addressed to 
the California State Controller and dated January 19, 1949. 
Most of the material in this letter is cumulative of material 
already introduced. It refers to the decree of March 20, 1948, 
limiting the right of foreigners to acquire real estate except 
'on the basis of legal inheritance,' and then points out that such 
clause has been informally interpreted by the Yugoslav officials 
'to mean that foreign citizens may inherit property if they, 
under Yugoslav law, are considered to be the natural heirs of 
the deceased. If property is willed to some other person than 
the natural heir that person may not succeed to the property 
in question.' It is also pointed out that Americans succeeding 
to property in Yugoslavia would be faced with various restric-
tions and controls. The letter then discusses the penalties of 
dual citizenship, and then continues: 'Since 1945, the Em-
bassy has no record of any case where American citizens have 
been heirs in Yugoslav estates. It is generally believed that the 
political affiliations of the American heir would not affect his 
right to inherit unless he was a dual national and his property 
liable to confiscation for crimes against Yugoslavia.' 
"The only other exhibits introduced by respondent were 
two booklets of speeches by Yugoslav leaders which add 
nothing to the other evidence already mentioned. 
''On this evidence the trial court found that reciprocity as 
to both real and personal property did not exist. The estate 
here involved consisted, at the time of death, of both real and 
personal property, the real property having been sold during 
the course of administration. There can be no doubt at all 
that the weight of the evidence indicates that reciprocity 
exists. Certainly that is true as to the personal property. 
However, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that reciprocity 
exists as to the real property. It is probably true that there 
are evidence or inferences therefrom that support the finding of 
nonreciprocity as to real property. The evidence of the laws, 
decrees and interpretations to the effect that foreigners can 
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that a Yugoslav who acquires American citizenship forfeits his 
rights in real property in Yugoslavia, etc., probably support 
the finding of nonreciprocity as to the real property. But 
even as to this issue the evidence is not satisfactory because 
most of these laws, decrees and interpretations were passed or 
made after the death of the decedent here involved. It is the 
law in effect at the time of such death in which we are here 
interested. It is by no means clear that such laws, decrees and 
interpretations are construed to be retroactive. That may be 
cleared up on a new trial. 
"Even though it be assumed that there is some evidence, 
or inferences therefrom, that support the finding of nonrecipro-
city as to the real estate, there are other factors di>lclosed 
by the record that require a reversal and the granting of a new 
trial. The record discloses that the trial court considered and 
gave great weight to evidence not relevant to the issue of reci-
procity, and that the finding of nonreciprocity was partially 
based on this nonrelevant evidence. That this is so is conclu-
sively demonstrated by an examination of the transcript, of the 
memorandum opinion of the trial court, and of the findings. 
''On numerous occasions during the trial the court expressed 
great distrust of the form of government existing in Yugo-
slavia, and expressed great interest in what would happen to 
the bequest here involved when delivered in Yugoslavia. Great 
interest was shown in the foreign exchange regulations that 
would constitute a restraint on an American citizen trans-
ferring Yugoslav funds inherited there to this country. For 
example, the trial court stated at R.T. page 221: 'We know 
that Yugoslavia today is dominated by a Communistic govern-
ment. They are in power today. Now, this Court, the stand 
that I have taken is that I would have to have pretty good 
evidence before I would distribute to anyone, or to any govern-
ment back there that is dominated by the Communists. [What 
became of the presumption that reciprocity exists?] Having 
this case in mind, I met people who have been there, lived 
there, even when I was on a little vacation in Arizona, and I 
met a woman who lived there, and they took all of her property. 
They confiscated all of the business of her husband and her-
self.' At pages 135, 150, 160, 223 and 243 appear other 
comments by the trial judge indicating how strongly he was 
motivated by the fact that the government of Yugoslavia was 
socialistic or communistic. 
"The theory upon which the trial court proceeded is also 
disclosed in the memorandum opinion. It is there stated : 
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'Furthermore, it has not been established to the satisfaction of 
the Court that the said John Arbulich, Jr. (the Yugoslav heir] 
would receive the benefit of any distribution to him of the 
balance of the estate, consisting of cash in excess of $30,000.00. 
It was established at the hearings by the testimony of the Yugo-
slav Ambassador Kosanovic that the present government of 
Yugoslavia is Communistic and that the property rights of 
individuals are completely ignored. Under the circumstances 
the Court cannot in good conscience order $30,000.00 or more 
distributed to the claimant in Yugoslavia or to any representa-
tive of that country without any assurance whatever that the 
distributee would ever receive any part of such funds.' 
''Thus the trial judge not only indicated that he would 
not consider the presumptions already mentioned in favor of 
reciprocity, but also indicated that he had forgotten or would 
not consider the documentary and oral testimony to the effect 
that the Yugoslav heir would be permitted in Yugoslavia to 
enjoy the full benefits of the bequest. 
"The weight given by the trial court to these factors 
is also disclosed in the formal findings. Finding X reads as 
follows : 'That at the time of death of said decedent the Govern-
ment of Yugoslavia was Communistic and has been ever since, 
and that the property rights of individuals are ignored, 
and that, under the circumstances, the Court could not, in good 
conscience, order distribution to the claimant in Yugoslavia. 
That under the laws and regulations of Yugoslavia, John Ar-
bulich, Jr., does not have any rights of ownership or control 
of his property, and if distribution were ordered to John 
Arbulich, Jr., it would, in fact, be distribution to the Commu-
nistic Government of Yugoslavia. Such distribution would 
be against public policy and contrary to provisions of Section 
27 of the California Probate Code.' 
"There is no evidence at all that the Yugoslav claimant 
would not be permitted to enjoy his legacy in Yugoslavia. 
The evidence is all the other way. The solemn declaration 
o£ the Ambassador from Yugoslavia that the Yugoslav claim-
ant would receive the money free of any tax and that he 
would enjoy 'free and unabridged use and enjoyment thereof' 
could not thus lightly be disregarded. The ambassador is 
the highest diplomatic official of the country he represents, and 
his declarations about the law and practices in his country 
are entitled to great weight. 
"The fact that the court disapproved of the form of the 
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government of Yugoslavia was not relevant at all on the issue 
of reciprocity. Yugoslavia is a sovereign state and is recog-
nized as such by the government of the United States. As 
long as some right of inheritance is recognized in that state, 
and the evidence here without conflict discloses that it is, the 
fact that such right differs from the right of inheritance in 
this country, or that as an individual a judge may disapprove 
of the form of government, are factors which are not relevant 
and should not be considered on the issue of reciprocity. This 
was clearly pointed out in the Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal. 
App.2d 621 [235 P.2d 837], involving Romania, a country 
that is not only communistic, but within the sphere of influence 
of Russia, which Yugoslavia certainly is not. Some degree of 
socialization and nationalization has taken place in most Euro-
pean countries, a policy we as individuals may or may not 
approve, but as judges passing on the issue of reciprocity, the 
form of such governments is a false factor, and a matter for 
each sovereign country to determine for itself. 
"The fact that an American claimant of an estate in Yugo-
slavia would be subject to foreign exchange controls and 
could not immediately receive his legacy in this country is 
also an irrelevant factor. Practically every country in the 
world has some limitation on the export of wealth from the 
country. Such factor has nothing to do with the issue of 
reciprocity. It was so held in Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 
1 [230 P.2d 667], and Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232 [150 
P.2d 567]. 
"Much is said in the briefs about the proper interpretation 
of the treaty of 1881 and about how such treaty should be 
interpreted in view of the case of Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 
[67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633, 170 A.L.R. 953]. The question 
is not how that treaty should be interpreted as a matter of law, 
but how the contracting parties have interpreted it. The ambas-
sador testified that it had been interpreted to grant reciprocity 
to all American nationals. While there is no evidence directly 
contrary to this, there may be inferences that would support a 
finding to the contrary. Any gaps in the evidence on this 
point can be supplied on the new trial. 
''Enough has been said to indicate that the finding of 
lack of reciprocity was based partially upon inadmissible evi-
dence, upon factors irrelevant to the issues, and upon laws and 
regulations and decrees passed after the death. of decedent. 
This being so, the judgment cannot stand. A new trial should 
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be had at which only admissible evidence and relevant factors 
are considered. 
"There is one other point that must be considered. Re-
spondent contends, and the trial court found, that appellant 
was not properly represented in the proceeding. For that 
reason, it is urged, this judgment must be affirmed. It should 
be pointed out that, in spite of this finding, the trial court 
also disposed of the case on its merits. Such disposition is, 
of course, inconsistent with a finding that the appellant had 
made no proper appearance in the action. 
"The contention that appellant was not properly repre-
sented is based upon the fact that the lawyer appearing on 
behalf of appellant was appointed by the consul general of 
Yugoslavia to represent appellant. The lawyer had no power 
of attorney from appellant nor any other direct authority to 
represent him. Throughout the trial. counsel for respondent 
objected on this ground, and the trial judge, on many occasions, 
observed that he thought a personal power of attorney was 
indispensable. As already pointed out, an express finding was 
made on this issue. 
"'rhe petition of John Arbulich, Jr., alleges that it is 
filed by the consul general of Yugoslavia as attorney in fact 
for John. It is further averred that under the power and 
authority vested in the consul general by the United States and 
by the laws and treaties between the United States and Yugo-
slavia, he, as consul general, has the power and authority to 
act as attorney in fact for his nationals who inherit American 
property. The recognition by the United States of the consul 
general with power 'to exercise and enjoy such functions, 
powers and privileges as are allowed to the Consuls General 
of the most favoured Nations in the United States' was duly 
proved. The question is, can the consul general appear in our 
courts as attorney in fact for his nationals in a probate pro-
ceeding? Can a consul appoint counsel to represent such 
nationals? The answer is clear that he may. 
"The parties discuss the proper interpretation of an artir·lr· 
in the Consular Convention between the United States and 
Serbia concluded in 1881, contemporaneous with the other 
Serbian treaty already mentioned in this opinion, and, like it, 
recognized by both the United States and Yugoslavia as being 
still binding. Article XI provides: 
" 'In the case of the death of any citizen of the United 
States in Serbia, or of a Serbian subject in the United States 
without having any known heirs or testamentary executors by 
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him appointed, the competent local authorities shall give in-
formation of the circumstances to the Consuls or Consular 
Agents of the nation to which the deceased belongs, in order 
that the necessary information may be immediately forwarded 
to the parties interested. 
'' ' Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls and Consular 
Agents shall have the right to appear personally, or by dele-
gate, in all proceedings on behalf of the absent or minor heirs 
or creditors until they are duly represented.' 
''The parties argue over the proper interpretation of this 
treaty. Appellant argues that the second paragraph should 
be read independently of the first so as to give the consul 
general the power alleged to exist. Respondent argues that the 
first paragraph limits the operation of the second paragraph to 
nationals dying abroad in the other country, and does not 
include the right to represent in the other country nationals 
residing at home. If the document alone be considered, either 
interpretation is reasonable. But the treaty provision must be 
considered together with applicable principles of international 
law. Without reference to any treaty provision, it is a well 
settled principle of international law that consular representa-
tives are deemed to be international attorneys in fact for their 
nations. One of the earliest cases so holding, and a leading 
case on the subject, is The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 
152 [5 L.Ed. 229]. In that case the United States Supreme 
Court held that a vice consul of Spain was entitled to make 
a claim by way of libel on behalf of Spanish owners of a 
Spanish ship resident in Spain and whose identities were 
unknown to the consul. In that case the following frequently 
quoted statement appears ( p. 168) : 'On the first point made 
by the attorney-general, this court feels no difficulty in decid-
ing, that a vice-consul, duly recognized by our government, is 
a competent party to assert or defend the rights of property of 
the individuals of his nation, in any court having jurisdiction 
of causes affected by the application of international law. To 
watch over the rights and interests of their subjects, wherever 
the pursuits of commerce may draw them, or the vicissitudes 
of human affairs may force them, is the great object for which 
consuls are deputed by their sovereigns ; and in a country 
where laws govern, and justice is sought for in courts only, it 
would be a mockery, to preclude them from the only avenue 
through which their course lies to the end of their mission. 
The long and universal usage of the courts of the United 
States, has sanctioned the exercise of this right, and it is im-
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possible, that any evil or inconvenience can flow from it. 
Whether the powers of the vice-consul shall, in any instance, 
extend to the right to receive, in his national character, the 
proceeds of property libelled and transferred into the registry 
of a court, is a question resting on other principles. In the 
absence of specific powers given him by competent authority, 
such a right would certainly not be recognized. Much, in 
this respect, must ever depend upon the laws of the country 
:from which, and to which, he is deputed. And this view of the 
subject will be found to reconcile the difficulties supposed to 
have been presented by the authorities quoted on this point.' 
"In the case of In re Tartaglia's Estate, 12 Misc. 245 [33 
N.Y.Supp. 1121], it was held, both as a result of an interpre-
tation of a treaty with Italy and by general international law, 
that the Italian consul general could properly apply and 
receipt for the distributive shares of personal property on 
behalf of the Italian heirs. 
''In the case of Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 41 
N.Y.Supp.2d 752, there is a good collection of case and text 
authorities. There, both by treaty and on general principles, 
the Estonian consul general was permitted to appear and set 
aside a default judgment, and to defend a suit against the 
Estonian State Bank, treated in the opinion as a private 
person. 
"The case of In re Zalewski's Estate, 292 N.Y. 332 [55 
N.E.2d 184, 157 A.L.R. 87], is another good case on the sub-
ject, and collects and comments on many relevant authorities. 
There it was held by the New York Court of Appeals that 
either by treaty or by general principles of international law, a 
consular representative could even exercise on behalf of one of 
its nationals resident in the home country the personal right 
of a widow to elect not to take under a will. While three 
justices dissented in that case, they did so only on the ground 
that the power of the consul did not extend to the exercise of 
such a personal right-they did not disagree with the majority 
holding that a consul has the right to appear and to represent 
his nationals. 
"In interpreting the treaty provision here involved, the 
fo1lowing principles stated in In re Zalewski's Estate, 292 
N.Y. 332 [55 N.E.2d 184, 186, 157 A.L.R. 87], amply supported 
by authority, are applicable: 'In arriving at the meaning of the 
treaty we are bound to remember that it is the supreme law of 
the land . . ., that its words are to be taken liberally in the 
light of evident purposes . . . and that, since the pact is done 
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in counterparts, one in each language little use can be made of 
local technical definitions of words. . . . When two construc-
tions of a treaty are admissible, one restrictive of the rights 
that may be claimed under it and the other liberal, the latter 
is always to be preferred .... ''This court would not readily 
lean to favor a restricted construction of language, as applied 
to the provisions of a treaty, which always combines the 
characteristics of a contract, as well as a law.'' The Bello 
Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 152, 171 [5 L.Ed. 229].' 
"With these well settled principles in mind we have no 
reasonable doubt but that the treaty here involved should be 
interpreted so as to confer a treaty right on the consuls of the 
contracting countries to appear on behalf of their nationals not 
otherwise represented and to represent them in the courts of 
the other country. 
''This conclusion would be almost inevitable were it not for 
the case of Estate of Clausen, 202 Cal. 267 [259 P. 1094]. 
There it was held that the Danish consul did not have the right 
to receive distribution of and receipt for the interests of 
Danish nationals under the then treaty with Denmark. The 
treaty there involved was one entered into in 1826 and related 
solely to problems of navigation and commerce existing be-
tween the two countries. It contained a clause that for the 
protection of navigation and commerce each country would 
agree to receive and admit consuls from the other who should 
enjoy all the privileges and powers of consuls conferred by 
either on the consuls of the most favored nation. Nearly a 
hundred years after this treaty was entered into, United States 
entered into a much broader treaty with Germany which ex-
pressly conferred upon consuls of either country the power on 
behalf of nonresident nationals to receive and to receipt for 
distributive shares of estates to which such nonresident na-
tionals were entitled. The Supreme Court of California ruled, 
purely as a matter of interpretation of the treaty, and without 
reference to general principles of international law, that the 
treaty between Denmark and the United States related solely 
to problems of navigation and commerce, and that the powers 
conferred by that treaty on consuls related solely and exclu-
sively to such problems. 'fhus the treaty with Germany did not 
operate under the most favored nation clause to confer any 
rights on Danish consuls except in connection with navigation 
and commerce. The court did not discuss the right of the 
Danish consul to appear and represent his national residing in 
Denmark in the probate proceeding under the general prin-
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ciples of international law above discussed. It simply decided 
that such consul, under the treaty, had no power to have dis-
tributed to himself and to receipt for the share of the estate to 
which the Danish national was entitled. (See, also, Petersen 
v. Lyders, 139 Cal.App. 303 (33 P.2d 1030], and Lyders v. 
Petersen, 88 F.2d 9.) 
''The present case differs from the Clausen case in several 
particulars. The present case does not involve the right of 
the Yugoslav consul general to have distributed to him and to 
receipt for the property bequeathed to appellant. The pro-
ceeding on appeal is not for distribution, but to determine 
heirship. Several times during the trial counsel appointed by 
the consul general stated that he was not contending that the 
estate should be distributed and receipted for by the consul 
general. He agreed that the court could order the estate dis-
tributed directly to appellant, and, in that event, offered to 
see that the estate was distributed to appellant and receipted 
for by him. This is important, not only because it serves to 
distinguish the instant case from the Clausen case, but because 
it also meets the doubts expressed in the case of the Bello 
Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 152 [5 I.1.Ed. 229]. In the quota-
tion from that case above set forth the United States Supreme 
Court expressed doubt that, under general principles of 
international law, a consular representative could have the 
proceeds of the pending action distributed to himself, but had 
no doubts about the power of such representative to appear and 
to represent his absent national. 
"In the second place, the Clausen case limited its decision 
to an interpretation of the treaty involved. It did not discuss 
the power of a consul, independent of treaty, to appear and 
to represent his nonresident nationals in lawsuits in the 
country to which such consul was accredited. 
"In the third place, the instant case is distinguishable from 
the Clausen case because unlike the treaty involved in the 
Clausen case, the treaty here, properly interpreted, confers 
the very power involved. Moreover, under general principles 
of international law, consuls possess the power to appear for 
and to represent their nonresident nationals in the courts of 
the country to which such consul is accredited.'' 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing· was denied J·une 18, 
El53. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
